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14 September 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR COUNCIL GALLAGHER

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. E. A. Tamm, F.B.I.,
Friday afternoon, 13 September 1946.

There follows the substance of a conversation which I had yesterday afternoon with Mr. E. A. Tamm, Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I explained to Mr. Tamm that I was calling on him for the purpose of exploring two unrelated subjects. The first had to do with the replacement by CIO of FBI personnel in Latin America. I told Mr. Tamm that General Vandenberg had received from Mr. Hoover a letter in which Mr. Hoover stated that his representatives in [redacted] were to be withdrawn in the near future. Mr. Hoover continued that the FBI proposed to continue coverage of these areas by representatives of FBI in adjacent countries. I told Mr. Tamm that General Vandenberg intended to support this procedure, and in order to do so desired certain additional information so that he could intelligently support the position of the Bureau and avoid the possibility of CIO being called upon to introduce people into these areas prior to the time that it could be done effectively. Mr. Tamm replied that he understood the General's reason for calling for more information and regretted that he could not give us the details immediately. He promised, however, to prepare a detailed plan by which individuals could make periodic visits to the countries concerned and by which informants in these countries could be retained and exploited to the extent necessary. Mr. Tamm promised to have this information available to us by noon Monday, September 16.

The second question which Mr. Tamm and I discussed had to do with investigations of personnel to be employed by CIO. I explained to Mr. Tamm that a security investigation of all candidates for employment by CIO was obviously essential; that CIO in taking over SSU was carefully considering methods and procedures used by that organization and was not satisfied with the present policy of investigating individuals. Through necessity SSU had been required to employ the services of a private investigator whose discretion, it developed, left much to be desired. I explained that CIO did not wish to continue the service of private investigators and eliminating this policy two possibilities were presented for conducting these essential checks. First, the FBI could conduct security investigations

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for CIG. This plan, I stated, was by far the most desirable from our point of view. Mr. Tamm told me that he and Mr. Hoover had discussed the necessity for security checks of CIG personnel and they agreed that some method had to be followed in order to avoid unfortunate events. Mr. Tamm stated that he considered it possible that the Bureau would carry on this work for us, and he would like to know in this connection about how many investigations we would have and what the time limit on reports would be. I stated that since we were in the initial stages of personnel procurement and needed a large number of people quickly we could expect the peak load at this time, and it would probably, for several months, average about 100 cases each month. I gave various reasons for the great desirability of having reports received promptly so that a final decision could be made on the employment of candidates and stated that a period of two weeks from the submission of the request until the receipt of the report would be considered entirely satisfactory. Mr. Tamm promised that he would discuss the matter with the Director and would assume in his discussions with Mr. Hoover that the check made by FBI would have to do solely with the security of the individual concerned and would in no way reflect on his professional ability or his other qualifications. I stated that this was entirely correct. I further suggested to Mr. Tamm that if he and Mr. Hoover decided they could not undertake the entire burden of security checks for CIG that they consider as much as was possible and then offer to us certain well-qualified personnel, advice, and direction in setting up our own investigating staff which would work closely with the FBI in accomplishing all checks necessary for CIG. Mr. Tamm replied that he would consider this possibility after he had discussed the matter of FBI handling such investigations alone. This latter procedure, I emphasized, was the one that offered the greatest advantage to CIG, and that it was hoped that the Bureau would be able to assume responsibility for the work. Mr. Tamm told me that he would let us know early next week what the decision was.

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